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Abstract
A novel, swine-origin influenza H1N1 virus (H1N1pdm) caused the first pandemic of the 21
st century. This pandemic,
although efficient in transmission, is mild in virulence. This atypical mild pandemic season has raised concerns regarding the
potential of this virus to acquire additional virulence markers either through further adaptation or possibly by immune
pressure in the human host. Using the mouse model we generated, within a single round of infection with A/California/04/
09/H1N1 (Ca/04), a virus lethal in mice—herein referred to as mouse-adapted Ca/04 (ma-Ca/04). Five amino acid
substitutions were found in the genome of ma-Ca/04: 3 in HA (D131E, S186P and A198E), 1 in PA (E298K) and 1 in NP
(D101G). Reverse genetics analyses of these mutations indicate that all five mutations from ma-Ca/04 contributed to the
lethal phenotype; however, the D131E and S186P mutations—which are also found in the 1918 and seasonal H1N1
viruses—in HA alone were sufficient to confer virulence of Ca/04 in mice. HI assays against H1N1pdm demonstrate that the
D131E and S186P mutations caused minor antigenic changes and, likely, affected receptor binding. The rapid selection of
ma-Ca/04 in mice suggests that a virus containing this constellation of amino acids might have already been present in Ca/
04, likely as minor quasispecies.
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Introduction
In April 2009, a novel H1N1 influenza virus (H1N1pdm)
emerged in North America causing the first influenza pandemic
of the 21
st century [1,2,3]. This pandemic strain is a triple-
reassortant virus of swine origin containing genes from avian,
swine and human influenza viruses. It is genetically related to
triple reassortant swine H1N1 influenza viruses currently
circulating in North America, with the exception of the
neuraminidase (NA) and matrix (M) genes, which derive from
an Eurasian swine influenza virus. Although the virus is highly
transmissible in humans, H1N1pdm infections have been
characterized with mostly mild symptoms [1,2,3]. In addition to
some preexisting immunity [4], the relatively mild illness
associated with H1N1pdm in humans is consistent with the
absence of several virulence markers previously identified in other
human and avian influenza virus strains. The H1N1pdm lacks
K627 in the polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2), does not encode
the pro-apoptotic PB1-F2 protein, and contains a nonstructural
NS1 protein lacking the PDZ domain [5,6,7]. Interestingly,
reports indicate that introducing K627 into the PB2 or the PB1F2
protein into the PB1 gene does little to enhance the pdm H1N1’s
virulence [8,9]. The H1N1pdm’s mild presentation of disease
resembles the first wave of the 1918 and 1968 pandemics which
were followed by a more severe second wave [10]. In swine, the
triple reassortant influenza viruses have shown a tendency to
reassort and give rise to viruses with distinct antigenic
characteristics [11]. Thus, the potential acquisition of virulence
markers by the H1N1pdm virus is of great concern.
To date there are no conclusive reports that indicate an increase
in virulence of the H1N1pdm virus, although some severe cases
have been associated with a D222G mutation on the HA
[12,13,14,15,16]. Therefore, we wanted to determine if the
H1N1pdm virus could gain virulence through adaptation in the
mouse model. In our initial studies with the prototypical
H1N1pdm strain, A/California/04/09 (H1N1), (Ca/04) we
observed that the virus was not lethal for Balb/c mice at a dose
of 10
6 TCID50. However, DBA/J2 mice, which have recently
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than Balb/c mice [17,18], succumbed to challenge with the same
virus dose. Interestingly, when Balb/c mice were infected with
lung homogenates from Ca/04-infected DBA/J2 mice, an increase
in virulence was observed. Further testing of this virus showed a
1,000-fold increase in virulence in Balb/c as compared to wild
type (wt) Ca/04 by 50% lethal dose (LD50) assays. Sequence and
reverse genetics analyses identified 5 amino acid changes in the
PA, HA and NP genes that were responsible for the lethality in
Balb/c mice. Although all five mutations participated in
modulating virulence, those in the HA were the most important.
Of particular significance are the D131E and S186P mutations in
HA, which are also found in the 1918 pandemic viruses,
suggesting that the H1N1pdm could become further adapted in
and/or virulent for humans.
Results
A virulent H1N1pdm virus is rapidly selected in DBA/J2
mice
Pathogenesis studies have been performed in mice and other
animal models in order to elucidate the H1N1pdm virus’s
molecular markers of virulence [19,20]. Consistent with previous
reports, we observed that the H1N1pdm virus was virulent for
Balb/c mice, however only at high concentrations ($10
7 TCID50).
In our study, Balb/c mice infected intranasally with 5.4x10
5
TCID50 of Ca/04 showed significant body weight loss (,20%)
during the first 7 days post-infection (dpi), but eventually recovered
(Fig 1A, B). This is in stark contrast to the 1918 pandemic strains,
which are lethal for mice at concentrations significantly lower than
10
5 TCID50 [21]. In contrast to the Balb/c study, we found that
Ca/04 was lethal for DBA/J2 mice, which succumbed to infection
by 7 dpi at the same dose of 5.4610
5 TCID50 (Fig 1A, B). This
result is not necessarily unexpected since previous studies have
shown that DBA/J2 mice have an increased susceptibility to
influenza virus infection [17,18,22]. In order to determine whether
the virus population lethal to DBA/J2 mice had an altered
phenotype compared to the Ca/04 virus used as inoculum, lung
homogenates from the affected DBA/J2 mice were used to infect
three naı ¨ve Balb/c mice (DBA-Balb/c, Fig 1A, B). Interestingly,
the virus contained in the DBA-mouse lung homogenates was
lethal for Balb/c mice (Fig 1A, B). Balb/c mice succumbed to
infection by 7 dpi, a timeframe that resembled the Ca/04 infection
of DBA mice. The virus titer of the DBA-lung homogenates, used
as inoculum for infection of Balb/c mice, was 1.2610
5 TCID50,
indicating that lethality in Balb/c mice was not due to an
increased virus dose.
Because we could not rule out the possibility that the lethality of
the virus present in the DBA-mouse lung homogenates was not
due to the presence of cytokines and other substances toxic to
Balb/c mice, lung homogenates from the Balb/c mice were grown
in MDCK cells and the virus obtained was arbitrarily designated
as mouse-adapted Ca/04 (ma-Ca/04). In vitro growth kinetics
revealed that the ma-Ca/04 virus grew faster and yielded more
than 10-fold higher titers than Ca/04 in MDCK cells (Fig 1C). To
further characterize the ma-Ca/04 virus, pathogenesis and
replication were evaluated in the Balb/c mouse and ferret models.
The mouse 50% lethal dose (MLD50) of ma-Ca/04 in Balb/c mice
was 3.3 (log10TCID50), whereas that of the wild type virus was
.6.0 (log10TCID50) indicating that indeed the virus had become
more virulent for Balb/c mice (Table 1). Since we use virus from
MDCK tissue culture supernatants, it is unlikely that cytokines or
other substances are contributing to the ma-Ca/04 more lethal
phenotype. The ma-Ca/04 also grew to higher titers in the lungs
of mice compared to Ca/04 by 3 dpi (Fig 1D). H&E staining
showed that the Ca/04 caused mild and limited alveolitis (Fig 1F).
In contrast, lungs of mice infected with the ma-Ca/04 showed
prominent lung pathology with severe alveolitis, characterized by
the infiltration of neutrophils, lymphocytes and macrophages
(Fig 1G). Immunohistochemistry for viral antigen showed more
extensive positive staining in the bronchiolar lumen of ma-Ca/04-
infected lungs than in the Ca/04-infected lungs (Figure S1 A, B, D
and E). We also observed focal antigen staining in the alveolar area
of the ma-Ca/04-infected lungs (Figure S1 F), whereas virus
antigen was hardly detected in the alveolar area of Ca/04-infected
lungs (Figure S1 C). In summary, these studies suggest that the ma-
Ca/04 has increased virulence in the Balb/c mouse model when
compared to Ca/04.
To determine whether mouse adaptation of the Ca/04 virus
resulted in an altered fitness for other mammalian species, we
compared the replication and transmission of ma-Ca/04 to Ca/04
in ferrets. Infected, direct contact and respiratory contact ferrets in
the ma-Ca/04-infected and Ca/04-infected groups shed similar
amounts of virus over time (Fig 2A, B). Peak virus titers were
slightly higher in the ma-Ca/04 group however the differences
were not statistically significant (not shown). Likewise, the
transmission kinetics: onset of sneezing, peaks in body tempera-
ture, and body weight losses were similar between the two groups
(Table S1 and Figure S2) and to our previous studies with Ca/04
[23]. The exception was one ferret inoculated with the ma-Ca/04
showed significant diarrhea and body weight loss and was
humanely sacrificed at 6 dpi (Table S1). Replication and virus
distribution in different tissues demonstrated that titers in the nasal
turbinates of ferrets infected with ma-Ca/04 increased 10 fold over
the Ca/04 group (Fig 2C). Furthermore, the virus was isolated
from the olfactory bulb in one out of two ma-Ca/04 infected
ferrets, whereas no virus was detected in the olfactory bulb from
Ca/04-infected ferrets (Fig 2C). There was no obvious difference
in titers from lung and trachea, and virus could not be isolated
from the brain in either group (Fig 2C). These observations suggest
that the ma-Ca/04 maintains its infectivity and transmissibility for
ferrets at levels comparable to those observed with the Ca/04
virus.
Author Summary
The 19
th century experienced three major influenza
pandemics: the Spanish flu of 1918 (H1N1), the Asian flu
of 1957 (H2N2) and the Hong Kong flu of 1968 (H3N2).
These pandemics were introduced into the human
population through the accumulation of avian and human
influenza genes (genetic reassortment), creating with each
pandemic a novel influenza virus, one that the human
population had not been exposed to. These pandemics
were associated with high morbidity and mortality; the
1918 pandemic was responsible for an estimated 40
million deaths. In April 2009, a novel, swine-origin
influenza H1N1 virus (H1N1pdm) caused the first influenza
pandemic of the 21
st century. This pandemic was a result
of genetic reassortment between not only human and
avian influenza genes, but also swine influenza genes. This
H1N1 pandemic, although efficient in human-to-human
transmission, differed greatly from the previous pandemics
in its mild virulence. This atypical mild pandemic season
has raised concerns regarding the potential of this virus to
become more virulent. Using a mouse model, we were
able to demonstrate that this pandemic strain is amenable
to mutations that lead to a more virulent virus.
Virulence of 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Virus
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adaptation of Ca/04
To identify the molecular markers responsible for the
virulence of ma-Ca/04 in Balb/c mice, the viral genome was
sequenced and compared to Ca/04, as well as other H1N1pdm
influenza strains. Sequence analysis revealed that only five amino
acid substitutions had occurred during the adaptation of Ca/04:
3 in HA (D131E, S186P and A198E, based on the mature 1918
virus HA protein sequence [24,25]), 1 in PA (E298K) and 1 in
NP (D101G) (Fig 3 and Table 2). There were no amino acid
mutations found in the PB2, PB1, NA, M and NS genes. The
small number of mutations observed may be related to the low
passage in mouse lungs as suggested previously [26,27]. The
D131E mutation sits outside the major antigenic site Sa and the
receptor-binding site (RBS), potentially modulating access to the
sialic acid receptor (Fig 3A, B, and C). The S186P mutation
occurs within the RBS and so this mutation would have more of
a role modulating access to the sialic acid than position 131. The
S186P mutation overlaps also with antigenic site Sb (Fig 3A and
C). Likewise, the A198E mutation sits within the edge of Sb, and
is under immunological pressure (Fig 3B and C) [28,29]. In fact,
E198 is common in seasonal H1N1 strains [28,29]. Further
comparative sequence analysis showed that some current
pandemic strains share the same D131E or S186P mutation in
HA. As listed in Table 2, the amino acid at position 131 is E in
strains A/Hiroshima/220/2009(H1N1) and A/Singapore/
TLL52/2009(H1N1), and a mixture of D and E in strains A/
New York/09/2009 (H1N1), A/New York/12/2009 (H1N1),
A/New York/39/2009 (H1N1) and A/Ohio/07/2009 (H1N1).
And the amino acid at position 186 is P in strains A/Ankara/17/
2009 (H1N1), A/California/VRDL7/2009 (H1N1), A/Ontario/
25913/2009 (H1N1) and A/Swine/NC/19646/2010 (H1N1),
and a mixture of S and P in strains A/Kansas/03/2009 (H1N1)
and A/Ontario/10016/2009 (H1N1). Likewise, the D101G
mutation in the NP gene is found in the A/Mexico/4108/
2009 (H1N1) strain, and the E298K mutation in the PA gene is
found in the strain A/Korea/01/2009 (H1N1). These compar-
isons suggest that our adaptation scheme did not select for
mutations unique to virus adaptation in mice. Instead, it implies
that the Ca/04 may contain a mixed virus population, which was
selected out in DBA/J2 mice. It is worth noting that two
mutations in HA (D131E and S186P) are also highly conserved
in the 1918 pandemic H1N1 strains sequenced to date (Table 2).
It is tempting to speculate that amino acids at positions 131 and
186 are potential virulent determinants in H1N1 influenza
viruses.
Figure 1. Generation of an H1N1pdm virus lethal for Balb/c mice. A) % Body weight changes and B) % survival of Balb/c (n=4) and DBA
(n=4) mice inoculated intranasally with 5.4610
5 TCID50 of Ca/04. DBA-Balb/c corresponds to Balb/c mice infected with lung homogenates containing
the first passage Ca/04 virus from DBA mice. C) Growth kinetics of Ca/04 and ma-Ca/04 in MDCK cells. Viruses were inoculated at a multiplicity of
infection of 0.001. Supernatants were collected at the indicated time points and titrated in MDCK cells by TCID50. D) Balb/c mice inoculated
intranasally with 1.2610
4 TCID50 of ma-Ca/04 or Ca/04. Lungs from infected mice (n=3/time point) were collected at 3 and 6 dpi, homogenized and
virus titers measured in MDCK cells by TCID50. Results are expressed as log10 TCID50/gr of tissue. E, F, G) Balb/c mouse lungs were collected at 3 dpi as
described in D and fixed in 10% formalin, embedded in paraffin and sectioned. Serial sections were stained with H&E and the images were captured
at 620 magnification. E) Mock infected lung, F), Ca/04-infected lung, G) ma-Ca/04-infected lung.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.g001
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Although the ma-Ca/04 point mutations in ma-PA (E298K)
and ma-NP (D101G) are present in naturally occurring H1N1pdm
strains, they are not reflected in the consensus sequences for these
two viral proteins. Therefore, we wanted to evaluate if such
mutations affect polymerase activity. We assessed activity, using an
influenza minigenome assay consisting of a secreted luciferase
influenza replicon and plasmids encoding the polymerase complex
and NP - as described in materials and methods. Polymerase
activity was tested at different times post-transfection. The ma-PA
and ma-NP were tested individually, as well as in combination, in
the Ca/04 background, and compared to Ca/04 (Fig 4A). The
ma-PA E298K mutation increased polymerase activity 2.0-fold
compared to the wt PA from 24 h to 72 hours post-transfection
(hpt), whereas the ma-NP D101G mutation (when tested without
the ma-PA) reduced polymerase activity by ,0.9 fold compared to
the wt NP. The combined effect of ma-PA K298 and ma-NP
G101 resulted in fold increases of ,1.6 at 24 hpt, and ,1.8, at
72 hpt over the wt, consistent with a ,2 log10 increase in growth
kinetics for viruses carrying the ma-PA or the ma-PA and ma-NP
mutations (in the context of the ma-Ca/04 HA gene) compared to
the Ca/04 virus (Fig 4B).
Mutations in HA, PA and NP contribute to the virulence
of ma-Ca/04
To determine the role of each ma-Ca/04 mutation in the
virulence phenotype, the HA, PA and NP genes from the ma-Ca/
04 were cloned in a reverse genetics vector as previously described
[30]. Four recombinant viruses (Table 1) were generated using the
Ca/04 backbone. Pathogenesis studies in Balb/c mice indicated
that the three mutations in HA caused significant morbidity and
weight loss (maHA1:7Ca/04) however, the double mutants
maHA-PA2:6Ca/04 and maHA-NP2:6Ca/04 were more virulent
than maHA1:7Ca/04. The triple mutant, maHA-PA-NP3:5Ca/
04, was the most virulent recombinant tested (Fig 4C), indicating
all five mutations appear necessary to match the phenotype
observed with ma-Ca/04. Interestingly, MLD50 studies demon-
strated that mutations in HA alone (maHA1:7Ca/04) contributed
to a moderate increase in lethality; however, lethality increased in
the context of the ma-PA and ma-NP. These results indicate a
synergistic effect for the mutations in HA, PA and NP in ma-Ca/
04 for virulence (Table 1).
In order to confirm whether the virulent phenotype imparted
by mutations in the HA of ma-Ca/04, could modulate the
virulence of related H1N1pdm viruses, we generated additional
viruses in the backbone of A/Netherlands/602/09 (H1N1) –NL/
602- (Table 1 and Fig 4D). We observed that the MLD50 of wt
NL/602 went from 6.0 to 3.4 when provided the maHA gene;
maHA1:7NL/602 provided a MLD50 similar to the ma-Ca/04
virus. Previous reports have shown that the NL/602 is lethal to
Balb/c mice without prior adaptation (Fouchier R., pers
communication). Our results are consistent with this observation,
suggesting that the NL/602 virus contains a gene constellation
more virulent than Ca/04. There are 8 amino acid differences
between Ca/04 and NL/602: 3 in HA (P87S, T200A and
I324V), 1 in PA (M581L), and 1 in NP (P224S). The T200A
mutation is close to the A198E mutation found in ma-Ca/04 and
just outside of antigenic site B [29]. The I324V lies outside the
HA cleavage site, but its effects on cleavage remains to be
determined. It also unknown whether the amino acid differences
in PA and NP are responsible for the increased virulence of NL/
602 in mice compared to the Ca/04. However, the virulence of
NL/602 for mice can be greatly enhanced by incorporating the
HA gene from the ma-Ca/04 virus. The mice inoculated with
8.0610
4TCID50 of maHA1:7NL/602 succumbed to the infection
by 5 dpi (Fig. 4D). To further determine the effect of the HA
mutations in virulence, we created a recombinant virus carrying
the HA gene from A/New York/18/2009 (H1N1) (NY/18) in the
backbone of NL/602 (NY/18HA:7NL/602). The NY/18 virus
contains D131, S186 and A198 in the HA, the same amino acids
found in Ca/04 at those positions. The Ca/04 and NY/18 strains
differ at HA positions (P87S, T200A, S206T and I324V). In this
regard, the NL602 and NY/18 differ only at position S206T. As
expected the MLD50 of NY/18HA1:7NL/602 is .6.0 (Table 1).
Mice infected with 8.0610
4TCID50 of either NL/602 or NY/
18HA1:7NL/602 lost roughly 20% and 15%, respectively, of
their body weight within the first 7 dpi but eventually recovered
(Fig 4D). These studies are consistent with the notion that
mutations in the HA of mouse-adapted viruses can modulate
virulence [26,27].
131E/186P combination is the major contributor to
virulence imparted by ma-HA
Since the D131E and S186P mutations in the HA of ma-Ca/04
resemble amino acids present on the HA of the 1918 pandemic
viruses (Table 2), we hypothesize that these mutations were
responsible for the increased virulence of ma-Ca/04. To pinpoint
the contribution of each amino acid mutation in HA to the
virulence of ma-Ca/04, single and double mutants were generated
using the remaining 7 genes from Ca/04 (1:7 recombinants).
Balb/c mice (n=5) infected with 8.0610
4TCID50 of single mutant
186P, 131E, and 198E viruses showed average maximum
bodyweight losses of 19%, 11% and 6%, respectively. In contrast,
mice infected with 8.0610
4TCID50 of Ca/04 lost only 3.9% of
body weight (Fig 4E). These results demonstrate major contribu-
tions to virulence for amino acids at positions 131 and 186 in HA.
Lung virus titers of mice inoculated with single mutant 186P,
131E, and 198E viruses were similar to those for Ca/04 at 3 dpi
Table 1. MLD50 of wt and recombinant H1N1pdm viruses in
Balb/c mice.
Virus* MLD50 (log10TCID50)
Ca/04 .6.0
ma-Ca/04 3.3
maHA1:7Ca/04 6.0
maHA-PA2:6Ca/04 4.6
maHA-NP2:6Ca/04 4.8
maHA-PA-NP3:5Ca/04 3.8
NL/602 6.0
NY/18HA1:7NL/602 .6.0
maHA1:7NL/602 3.4
*Ca/04, A/California/04/09 (H1N1); ma-Ca/04, mouse-adapted Ca/04;
maHA1:7Ca/04, recombinant carrying the HA gene from ma-Ca/04 and
remaining 7 genes from Ca/04; maHA-PA2:6Ca/04, recombinant carrying the HA
and PA genes from ma-Ca/04 and remaining 6 genes from Ca/04; maHA-
NP2:6Ca/04, recombinant carrying the HA and NP genes from ma-Ca/04 and
remaining 6 genes from Ca/04; maHA-PA-NP3:5Ca/04, recombinant carrying the
HA, PA, and NP genes from ma-Ca/04 and remaining 5 genes from Ca/04; NL/
602, A/Netherlands/602/09 (H1N1); NY/18HA1:7NL/602, recombinant carrying
the HA gene from A/New York/18/09 (H1N1) and remaining 7 genes from NL/
602; maHA1:7NL/602, recombinant carrying the HA gene from ma-Ca/04 and
remaining 7 genes from NL/602.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.t001
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PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org 4 October 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e1001145Figure 2. Replication and transmission of ma-Ca/04 in ferrets. A) Four groups of ferrets consisting of 1 infected, 1 direct contact (DC), and 1
respiratory contact (RC) per group were infected with 10
6 TCID50 of ma-Ca/04 as described in materials and methods. The graph represents the
average 6 SD of virus shedding (log10 TCID50/ml of nasal wash) over time (in days, dpi) of inoculated (infected, grey open squares), direct contacts
(orange triangles), and respiratory contact ferrets (purple squares). B) Two groups of ferrets consisting of 1 infected, 1 direct contact (DC), and 1
respiratory contact (RC) per group were infected with 10
6 TCID50 of Ca/04 as described in materials and methods. The graph represents the average
6 SD of virus shedding (log10 TCID50/ml of nasal wash) over time (in days, dpi) of inoculated (infected, blue open squares), direct contacts (green
diamonds), and respiratory contact ferrets (red dots). Transmission was monitored by titrating the amount of virus in the nasal washes of ferrets
collected daily. BLD, below limit of detection (0.699 log10 TCID50/ml). C) Two ferrets/group were infected with 10
6 TCID50 of either Ca/04 or ma-Ca/04.
Infected ferrets were euthanized at 4 dpi and brains, olfactory bulbs nasal turbinates, tracheas, and lungs were collected, homogenized and titratedi n
MDCK cells by TCID50. Results show log10 TCID50/gr of tissue.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.g002
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PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org 5 October 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e1001145Figure 3. Structural analysis of amino acid mutations on the HA of ma-Ca/04. A) Side view of the H1 HA trimeric structure based on A/
South Carolina/1/1918 (H1N1) (PDB code: 1RUZ) [24] showing the 5 major antigenic sites [29] on the globular head of the molecule with respect to
amino acid changes between the ma-Ca/04 and Ca/04 viruses. RBS, receptor-binding site (dark blue); 131, D131E mutation (red); 186, S186P mutation
(green); Sa, antigenic site A (cyan); Sb, antigenic site B (light orange); Ca1, antigenic site C2a (purple); Ca2, antigenic site C2a (olive); Cb, antigenic site
Cb (lemon). B) Top view of H1 HA trimer as described in A); 198, A198E mutation (yellow) present on Sb. C) Close-up of the RBS in one of the HA
monomers, highlighting amino acids involved in receptor binding (138, 190, 194, 225, 226, and 228, in blue) with respect to amino acid mutations
between ma-Ca/04 and Ca/04 (D131E, red; S186P, green - part of the RBS -; and A198E, yellow). Structures generated using MacPymol (DeLano
Scientific).
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.g003
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higher, respectively, than for Ca/04 at 6 dpi (Fig 4G). Lung virus
titers were similar for the three single point mutants; however
186P and 131E viruses caused more morbidity than 198E virus
indicating that virus replication alone cannot account for
differences in virulence.
Mice infected with either double (131E/186P) or triple (131E/
186P/198E) HA mutant virus lost weight rapidly. The average
maximum body weight loss of mice infected with 131E/186P or
131E/186P/198E was 18% and 22%, respectively (Fig 4F).
However, mice infected with mutants 131E/198E or 186P/198E
lost 8% and 9% of their body weight, respectively (Fig 4F). These
results suggest that the 131E/186P combination is the major
contributor to virulence imparted by HA with the 198E mutation
adding virulence only when present with the 131E/186P
mutations. Lung virus titers for 131E/186P, 131E/198E and
131E/186P/198E were approximately 0.7, 0.6, and 0.6 log10
TCID50, respectively, higher than for Ca/04 at 3 dpi (Fig 4G).
Additionally, lung virus titers for the 131E/186P, 131E/198E,
186P/198E, and 131E/186P/198E mutants were approximately
1.1, 0.9, 0.7 and 1.2 log10 TCID50 higher than for Ca/04 at 6 dpi
(Fig 4G). Thus, these single and double mutants clearly
demonstrate that the D131E and S186P mutations, alone and in
combination, can increase the virulence of the pandemic H1N1
virus in Balb/c mice.
Mutations found in ma-HA cause minor antigenic
changes
Given that positions 131, 186 and 198 in HA are located within
or in close proximity to major antigenic sites and that 186 is within
the RBS pocket (Fig 3), it was anticipated that these mutations
could modulate antigenicity and receptor binding. Therefore, we
used four ferret sera and two monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) raised
against the H1N1pdm virus to evaluate the antigenic profile of
ma-Ca/04 and compared it to other H1N1pdm viruses (Table 3
and data not shown). The four ferret sera showed a distinct HI
profile dependent on the HA mutation. These sera had the lowest
HI titer when HA protein carried 131E and/or 186P mutations
(Table 3). The 131E/186P double mutation resulted in 7.4-fold
lower HI titer than those obtained with the Ca/04 virus generated
by reverse genetics. The 131E and 186P single mutants also
displayed 4.5-fold and 3.9-fold lower HI titers, respectively,
compared to the Ca/04 virus. In contrast, the single 198E
mutation resulted in the highest HI titer (1.8-fold higher than with
Ca/04). The HI profiles from 131E, 186P, 198E and 131E/186P
mutant viruses were significantly different (p,0.01) than the one
obtained for Ca/04. However, the HI titers from the double
mutants, 131E/198E, 186P/198E, and the triple mutant, 131E/
186P/198E, showed no statistical differences with the HI titer
obtained for Ca/04 (p.0.05). Interestingly, one of the two
monoclonal antibodies, mAb 5H7, had a different HI profile
dependent on the HA mutations, mAb 3B2, showed no differences
in the HA profile, regardless of the mutant used. The mAb 5H7
had the highest HI titers when the HA protein carried the 186P
mutation, whether alone as the single mutant or in concert with
the 131E and/or 131E/198E viruses. These viruses resulted in 8-
fold higher titers than those obtained with Ca/04. The 131E single
mutant also showed a 4-fold higher HI profile than the Ca/04. In
contrast, the 198E single mutant had an HI titer 4-fold lower than
the Ca/04 virus. It is also worth noting that the 198E mutation
appears to affect HI titers using either the ferret polyclonal sera or
the mAb 5H7 in the context of double mutations, either in
association with 131E or 198P. Coincidentally, the HI profile
analysis for these HA mutants follows the pattern of virulence of
ma-Ca/04. Mutations at positions 131 and 186 had the highest
impact by altering the antigenic make up of the molecule and its
virulence.
Host range implications of 131E and 186P mutations in
H1N1 viruses
We have shown that the D131E and S186P mutations increased
the virulence for mice and conferred minor antigenic changes to
the Ca/04 H1N1pdm virus. To determine the prevalence of such
mutations we evaluated the host adaptation and/or host selection
profile of H1 HA proteins from avian, swine, and human influenza
viruses. From 1930 to 1998, 100% of H1 HAs from North
American swine H1N1 isolates carried 131E, whereas 97% of
them had 186P (including the prototype strain A/swine/Iowa/15/
1930, SW30). North American swine H1N1 viruses started to
carry the 131D and 186S mutations from 1999 onward. Analyses
of swine H1 influenza sequences in Genbank indicate that from
1999 to 2009, North American swine H1N1 contain 81% 131D
and 67% 186S. This data indicates a dominant presence of 131D
and 186S in the recent North American swine H1N1 viruses,
which have resulted through evolution in the swine population. In
contrast, 100% of avian H1N1 influenza viruses, isolates collected
from 1976 to 2009, carry 131E and 98% encode for 186P. Only
one isolate, A/quail/Nanchang/12-340/2000 (H1N1), possesses
186S. Interestingly, up until 1919, 100% of human H1N1 strains
Table 2. Comparison of amino acid differences between Ca/
04 and ma-Ca/04 viruses and other H1N1 viruses.
Virus HA PA NP
131 186 198 298 101
Ca/04 D S A E D
ma-Ca/04 E P E/A K G
A/Netherlands/602/2009 (H1N1) D S A E D
A/New York/18/2009 (H1N1) D S A E D
A/Hiroshima/220/2009 (H1N1) E SAED
A/Singapore/TLL52/2009 (H1N1) E SAED
A/Ohio/07/2009 (H1N1) D/E SAED
A/New York/09/2009 (H1N1) D/E SAED
A/New York/12/2009 (H1N1) D/E SAED
A/New York/39/2009 (H1N1) D/E SAED
A/Mexico/4108/2009 (H1N1) D S A E G
A/Korea/01/2009 (H1N1) D S A K D
A/Ankara/17/2009 (H1N1) D P A- -
A/Kansas/03/2009 (H1N1) D S/P AED
A/California/VRDL7/2009 (H1N1) D P AED
A/Ontario/10016/2009 (H1N1) D S/P AED
A/Ontario/25913/2009 (H1N1) D P AED
A/Swine/NC/19646/2010 (H1N1)* D P A - -
A/Brevig Mission/1/1918 (H1N1) EP AED
A/New York/1/1918 (H1N1) EP A- -
A/South Carolina/1/1918 (H1N1) EP A- -
A/London/1/1918 (H1N1) EP A- -
A/London/1/1919 (H1N1) EP A- -
(-) No sequence information.
*2009 pandemic H1N1 strain isolated from swine population.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.t002
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there is a hiatus of influenza sequence information from 1920 to
1932; however, from 1933 to 1997, only 6% of the human H1
isolates contained 186P. The S186P mutation was prominent from
1998 to 2000 (86%) and now dominates since 2000 (99% isolates).
In human strains, position 131 has transitioned from E131 to
N131, and then to practically 100% of T131. With the exception
of prior swine influenza strains that sporadically crossed to
Figure 4. Effects of amino acid mutations for virulence of ma-Ca/04. A) Polymerase activity measured with mini-genome assay. Each
transfection consisted of 6 plasmids encoding a minigenome influenza replicon (Gluc flanked by influenza NS gene untranslated regions), PB1, PB2,
PA, NP encoding plasmids from Ca/04 (or ma-Ca/04 as indicated) and SEAP (used to normalize transfection efficiency). Relative activity calculated as
the fold difference in the ratio of Luc/SEAP activity as described in materials and methods. Data corresponds to three independent experiments with
samples run in duplicates. The maPA corresponds to transfection of the ma-Ca/04 PA gene, the maPA-NP corresponds to transfection of the ma-Ca/
04 PA and ma-Ca/04 NP genes, the maNP corresponds to transfection of the ma-Ca/04 NP gene, the caPA-NP corresponds to transfection of the Ca/
04 PA and Ca/04 NP genes, and pDP2002 corresponds to empty vector control, respectively, in the minigenome assay. B) Growth kinetics of
recombinants of Ca/04 carrying either HA (maHA1:7Ca/04), HA and PA (maHA-PA2:6Ca/04), HA and NP (maHA-NP2:6Ca/04), or HA, PA, and NP
(maHA-PA-NP3:5Ca/04) from ma-Ca/04. Viruses were inoculated at a multiplicity of infection of 0.001. Supernatants were collected at the indicated
time points and titrated in MDCK cells by TCID50. C) % body weight over time in Balb/c mice (n=3) infected with viruses produced in B) (1.2610
5
TCID50/mouse). D) % body weight over time in Balb/c mice (n=3) infected with recombinant viruses of NL/602 carrying either the wt HA from NL/602
(NL/602), ma-Ca/04 HA (maHA1:7NL/602) or NY/18 HA (8.0610
4 TCID50/mouse). E) and F) % body weight over time in Balb/c mice (n=5) infected with
recombinants carrying single, double or triple mutations in HA in the backbone of Ca/04 (8.0610
4 TCID50/mouse). G) Mice (n=6/virus) inoculated
intranasally with mutants produced in E) (8.0610
4 TCID50/mouse). Lungs from infected mice (n=3/time point) were collected at 3 and 6 dpi,
homogenized and virus titers measured in MDCK cells by TCID50. Results are expressed as log10 TCID50/gr of tissue.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.g004
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introduction of H1N1pdm viruses. Since the 131E and 186P
mutations were present in the 1918 H1N1 viruses of avian origin,
we refer to these as avian-type mutations whereas the 131D and
186S mutations are labeled as swine-like mutations. Our analysis
suggests that in humans, H1 influenza viruses have shown
predilection for the 131E, 186P avian-type combination, which
could lead to viruses with altered virulence phenotypes.
Discussion
The 2009 pandemic H1N1 prototypical strain, A/California/
04/2009 (Ca/04), was isolated from a pediatric patient with
uncomplicated, upper respiratory tract illness [31]. In general,
infections with the 2009 H1N1 pdm virus have been mostly mild.
Mortality is usually associated with at-risk groups, including those
with chronic lung and heart conditions, obesity and, most
strikingly, pregnancy [32,33]. However, some deaths have
occurred in individuals with no known underlying conditions
and recovery of some critically ill children have resulted in
neurological sequeleae [32,33,34,35,36]. Previous reports indicate
that Ca/04 is also mild in Balb/c mice (MLD50.6 log10 PFU),
unlike the 1918 pandemic influenza strains [31]. In this study, we
confirmed the mild phenotype in Balb/c mice and found that Ca/
04 H1N1 causes significant morbidity/mortality only after
inoculation with a high virus dose (MLD50.6 log10 TCID50). In
contrast, the Ca/04 virus was lethal for DBA/J2 mice, a mouse
strain shown to be more susceptible to influenza [17,18].
Surprisingly, the virus isolated from the lungs of the DBA/J2
mice was lethal for Balb/c mice. This lethality was maintained in
Balb/c mice after subsequent passage of the virus obtained from
the DBA/J2 mice lungs to MDCK cells. The lethal virus – ma-
Ca/04 – was sequenced and compared to the parental Ca/04.
Five amino acid differences were found between the ma-Ca/04
and Ca/04 viruses, which were responsible for improving virus
replication and virulence. Mutations in PA (E298K) and NP
(D101G) modulated polymerase activity and contributed to
virulence, while mutations in HA (D131E, S186P, A198E) had
the highest impact on virulence for mice. These mutations not
only affected the virulence of the H1N1pdm virus in the context of
the Ca/04 background, but also the related NL/602 pdm strain.
These results suggest a dominant effect of HA mutations,
particularly those at positions D131E and S186P. These same
mutations also affected the antigenicity of HA as indicated by the
differential HI profile using polyclonal and monoclonal antibodies.
Altering receptor-binding activities has been proposed as a
mechanism that also alters antigenicity [37]. Changes in the HI
profile suggest structural changes that are consistent with this
notion. In this regard, it is worth noting the contribution of the
S186P mutation, which is under immunological pressure (Site b),
but which also appears to be under selection pressure in humans.
The conservation of P186 in current human H1N1 influenza
viruses, prior to the H1N1pdm viruses, is indeed remarkable.
Furthermore, sequence analysis shows the presence of P186 in
several 2009 H1N1 pdm viruses, occasionally as a mixed
population with S186 (Table 2). More recently, the sequence of
the HA gene of a 2009 H1N1 pdm isolated from swine was shown
to contain P186. Since these changes in HA are either close (131)
or within (186) the RBS site, we are tempted to speculate that they
modulate virulence by altering binding to sialic acids receptors. It
is important to mention that sera from ferrets infected with recent
seasonal H1N1 strains reacted poorly against the ma-Ca/04 and
Ca/04 viruses (not shown), and although ferret sera against reverse
genetics Ca/04 virus showed no significantly distinguishable HI
activities against the 131E/186P/198E triple mutant, the HI
profiles of the single mutants, 131E, 186P, and 198E, and the
double mutant, 131E/186P, were significantly different from the
Ca/04 virus (p,0.01). Thus, it remains to be seen what type of
impact a virus like ma-Ca/04 would have on the human
population. Those previously vaccinated and/or infected with
the H1N1pdm strain should have significant cross-neutralizing
antibodies.
Sequence analysis revealed that mutations found in ma-Ca/04
are also found scattered throughout other H1N1pdm strains,
although the combination of E131, P186, and E198 in HA, K298
in PA and G101 in NP were unique to ma-Ca/04. The quick
selection of ma-Ca/04 in mice suggests that a virus with this
constellation of amino acids might have been already present in
Ca/04, likely as minor quasispecies. In this regard, it is important
to consider the limited understanding of influenza quasispecies for
their potential contribution to host range and evasion of immune
surveillance, despite the great wealth of knowledge stemming from
the current influenza genome sequencing efforts. Selection of the
S186P mutation was obtained independently by plaque purifica-
tion of the Ca/04 virus in MDCK cells, indicating that a mixed
population is likely to exist (not shown). However, we did not
isolate the other four mutations observed after a single passage of
Ca/04 in DBA/J2 mice. It must be noted that plaque selection
may not necessarily be the best method to look for quasispecies as
plaque purification itself is simply another selection method for a
virus population that can create plaques. Sequence analysis of field
isolates indicate mixed populations at positions 131 and 186,
which we would like to speculate may be due to host pressure. In
this regard, the ideal approach for understanding influenza
quasispecies would be to rely on deep sequencing of viruses
Table 3. HI profile of Ca/04-derived HA mutant viruses using ferret polyclonal sera and two mouse monoclonal antibodies
developed against Ca/04.
Antibody Virus
Ca/04 131E 186P 198E 131E/186P 131E/198E 186P/198E 131E/186P/198E
Ferret sera
a 3200
4267
3200
3200
400
1067
667
800
1067
1067
800
667
6400
8533
5333
5333
400
667
400
400
6400
6400
4267
3200
5333
6400
4267
3200
2133
2667
1600
1600
mAb 5H7 1024 4096 8192 256 8192 1024 4096 8192
mAb 3B2 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192 8192
a, HI titers using 4 different ferret sera raised against Ca/04 obtained by reverse genetics.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.t003
Virulence of 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Virus
PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org 9 October 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e1001145present in the original swab sample. Such an approach is beyond
the scope of the present report. We must also note that we did not
attempt to adapt the virus directly in Balb/c mice, which could
have resulted in a different set of mouse-adapted mutations, unlike
those described in this report. In fact, this is indeed the case as
reported by Jacobs et al. (pers. communication). At the time of
writing of this report, Ilyushina et al reported the adaptation of
two H1N1pdm viruses, including Ca/04, in Balb/c mice (J. Virol.
2010, in press). Interestingly, nine amino acid positions were under
selective pressure including four in the ribonucleoprotein (RNP)
complex (PB2 E158G/A, PA L295P, NP D101G, and NP H289Y)
and five in the HA glycoprotein (K119N, G155E, S183P, R221K,
and D222G – H1 HA numbering). Interestingly, NP D101G and
HA S183P (186 in H3 numbering) were also found in our study. In
this latter report, however, the effects for virulence in mice of
amino acid mutations on the HA were not analyzed. Our report
clearly shows a significant impact on virulence in mice provided by
the 186P mutation, particularly in the context of the 131E
mutation.
Our results demonstrate the association between minor
antigenic changes involved in receptor binding and modulation
of virulence of influenza strains. The seasonality of influenza is
thought to occur, at least in part, due to the virus’s ability to evade
immune surveillance through antigenic drift. Less is known about
how antigenic changes lead to changes in virulence. In this report
we show that two amino acid mutations in the H1N1pdm HA, at
positions 131 and 186, can modulate virulence for mice. Based on
our extensive sequence analysis, we would like to speculate that
these amino acids are also responsible, among other potential
factors, for the mild presentation of the H1N1pdm in humans. We
consider the tracking of changes like these on the HA molecule to
be important to predict the evolutionary virulence of the new
H1N1pdm viruses.
Materials and Methods
Viruses and cells
A/California/04/09 (H1N1) (Ca/04) and A/New York/18/09
(H1N1) (NY/18) were kindly provided by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia. These viruses
were provided as passage 2 viruses in MDCK cells. Passage 3
viruses were generated and stocks prepared and maintained at
270uC until use. Alternatively, stocks were prepared using viruses
rescued by reverse genetics as indicated below. The A/Nether-
lands/602/09 has been previously described and was obtained by
reverse genetics using plasmids kindly provided by Ron Fouchier,
Erasmus Medical Center, The Netherlands [38]. Viruses were
titrated in MDCK (Madin-Darby canine kidney) cells to determine
the TCID50 by the Reed and Muench method [39]. MDCK cells
were maintained in Modified Eagle’s medium (MEM) (Sigma-
Aldrich, St. Louis, MO) containing 5% fetal bovine serum (FBS)
(Sigma-Aldrich). 293-T human embryonic kidney cells were
cultured in Opti-MEM I (GIBCO, Grand Island, NY) containing
5% FBS.
Mouse studies
Five-week-old female mice (Balb/c and DBA/J2) (Charles River
Laboratories) were anaesthetized with isofluorane before intrana-
sal inoculation with 50 ml virus suspension. In an initial evaluation,
DBA/J2 and Balb/c mice (n=4) were infected intranasally with
the Ca/04 virus (5.4610
5 TCID50). Body weight changes and
survival were recorded daily. Mice presenting $25% body weight
loss were humanely euthanized and counted as dead. For
adaptation studies lungs were collected from DBA/J2 mice, which
succumbed to infection with Ca/04 (n=2). Lungs were homog-
enized in PBS with antibiotics. After centrifugation at 6,000 rpm
for 10 min, 50 ml of supernatant from the homogenate was
passaged to naı ¨ve Balb/c mice (n=3). Lungs from these infected
Balb/c mice were then homogenized and inoculated into MDCK
cells to prepare a virus stock. The 50% mouse lethal dose (MLD50)
was calculated using different virus doses in Balb/c and DBA mice
(n=3/per virus dose). Body weight and survival were recorded
daily until 14 dpi. To evaluate the replication tropism of selected
H1N1 pdm viruses in mice, lungs were collected at 3 and 5 dpi
and titrated in MDCK cells. For histopathology analysis, mouse
lungs collected at 3 dpi were fixed in 10% formalin, embedded in
paraffin, sectioned and stained with hematoxylin and eosin (H&E).
In order to evaluate differences in virulence of Ca/04 compared to
related ma-Ca/04-derived mutants, the virus doses were adjusted
to 8.0610
4 TCID50/mouse.
Ferret studies
The experimental design to study transmission of influenza in
ferrets has been previously described [40]. Briefly, two ferrets (1/
cage) were lightly anesthetized with ketamine (20 mg/kg) and
xylazine (1 mg/kg) via an intramuscular injection and were
inoculated intranasally with 10
6 TCID50 of virus in PBS, 250 ml
per nostril. At 24 hpi, two naı ¨ve ferrets (1/cage) were introduced in
direct contact with the infected ferret. A second ferret (1/group)
was introduced as a respiratory contact separated from the
infected and direct contact by a wire mesh wall with no possibility
of physical contact. To monitor virus shedding and transmission
nasal washes were collected daily and titrated in MDCK cells.
Virus replication and tissue distribution were evaluated in groups
of two ferrets/virus inoculated with 10
6 TCID50 of either Ca/04
or ma-Ca/04, respectively. Ferrets were euthanized at 4 dpi.
Brain, olfactory bulb, nasal turbinate, trachea, and lungs were
collected, homogenized and titrated in MDCK cells as described
[41].
Ethics statement
Animal studies were conducted under ABSL-3 conditions
approved by USDA and performed according to the protocol R-
09-93 ‘‘Transmissibility of Influenza A Viruses’’ approved by the
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of the University of
Maryland.
Sequence analysis
The vRNA and cDNA were prepared as previously described
[30]. The eight fragments were amplified and sequenced using a
combination of universal [42] and custom made primers (available
upon request). Sequencing was performed using the Big Dye
Terminator v3.1 Cycle Sequencing kit (Applied Biosystems, Foster
City, CA) on a 3100 Genetic Analyzer (Applied Biosystems, Foster
City, CA) according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Generation of recombinant viruses by reverse genetics
The 8 gene segments of Ca/04 (passage 2 in MDCK cell) and
ma-Ca/04 (stock, passage1 in MDCK cell) were amplified by RT-
PCR and cloned in the bidirectional reverse genetics plasmid
pDP2002 [30]. Mutations of interest in the HA gene were
introduced using the QuickChange II site-directed mutagenesis kit
(Stratagene, Inc., La Jolla, CA) according to manufacturer’s
protocols. The presence of each mutation was confirmed by
sequencing. The recombinant viruses were recovered by transfec-
tion in co-cultured 293T and MDCK cells using eight plasmids as
previously described [43]. Recovered viruses were sequenced to
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cells and stocks were prepared and frozen at 270uC until use.
Minigenome assay for viral polymerase activity
A model viral RNA (vRNA), consisting of the Gaussia
Luciferase (GLuc) open reading frame flanked by the non-coding
regions of the influenza NS segment was used to assess polymerase
activity in a minigenome reconstitution assay. Briefly, 293T cells
were seeded in 6-well plates and transfected with 1 mg of the
reporter plasmid along with 1 mg of each of expression plasmids
encoding PB2, PB1, PA and NP using the TransIT-LT1 (Mirus,
Madison, WI) reagent following the recommendations of the
manufacturer. In addition, the pCMV/SEAP plasmid, which
encodes a secreted alkaline phosphatase gene, was co-transfected
into the cells to normalize the transfection efficiency. At the
indicated time points, supernatant from transfected cells were
harvested and assayed for both luciferase and secreted alkaline
phosphatase activities using either the BioLux Gaussia Luciferase
Assay Kit (NEB, Ipswich, MA) or the Phospha-Light Secreted
Alkaline Phosphatase Reporter Gene Assay System (A&D, Foster
City, CA) according to the manufacturers’ recommendation.
Relative polymerase activity was calculated as the ratio of
luciferase versus SEAP luminescence for three independent
experiments with duplicate samples.
Statistical analysis
Graphs were produced and statistical analysis performed using
the Prism software package (GraphPad Software Inc., La Jolla,
CA).
Supporting Information
Table S1 Peak virus titers and clinical signs in groups of ferrets
infected with either ma-Ca/04 or Ca/04 viruses.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.s001 (0.06 MB PDF)
Figure S1 Viral antigen distribution in lungs of H1N1pdm
infected mice. Immunohistochemistry staining was performed using
a biotin-conjugated monoclonal antibody prepared in our labora-
tory (3B2-Biotin) against the HA protein of the H1N1pdmvirus and
horseradish peroxidase-conjugated streptavidin. The viral antigen
was visualized using AEC substrate set (BD Biosciences, California,
USA). Lungs from Ca/04- and ma-Ca/04-infected Balb/c mice
werecollected at 3 dpi. Ca/04 virus antigenstaining was detected in
the bronchiolar lumen (A and B), however only rarely detected in
the alveolar area (C). Infection with ma-Ca/04 resulted in the
accumulation of extensive virus antigen positive cells in the
bronchiolar lumen (D and E), and also focal positive staining could
be detected in the alveolar area (F).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.s002 (3.75 MB TIF)
Figure S2 Clinical signs in ferrets infected with either Ca/04 or
ma-Ca/04. A) Median of % body weight changes over time for
ferrets infected with ma-Ca/04. Values were normalized using the
average of body weights of inoculated ferrets at 0 (zero) dpi and
represent the median values obtained from 4 groups of ferrets as
described in Fig 2A. Symbols correspond to inoculated (infected,
grey open squares), direct contact (orange triangles), and
respiratory contact ferrets (purple squares). B) Median of % body
weight changes over time for ferrets infected with Ca/04. Values
normalized as in A) and represent the median values obtained
from 2 groups of ferrets as described in Fig 2B. C) Body
temperature changes (in Celsius) over time in ferrets infected with
ma-Ca/04. Normal ferret temperature fluctuates between 37.2u to
40uC. Minor peaks in body temperature were observed for direct
contact and respiratory contact ferrets between 1 to 4 dpi. Fever
was observed for inoculated ferrets at 1 dpi. D) Body temperature
changes (in Celsius) over time in ferrets infected with Ca/04.
Minor peaks in body temperature were observed for the infected,
direct contact and respiratory contact ferrets between 1 to 4 dpi.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001145.s003 (0.30 MB TIF)
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